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Abstract
We analyse variations of carbon emissions in the European cement industry from
1990 to 2012, at the European level (EU 27), and at the national level for six
major producers (Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy and Poland).
We apply a Log-Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) method, cross-referencing data
from three databases: the Getting the Numbers Right (GNR) database devel-
oped by the Cement Sustainability Initiative, the European Union Transaction
Log (EUTL), and the Eurostat International Trade database.
Our decomposition method allows seven channels of emissions change to be
distinguished: activity, clinker trade, clinker share, alternative fuels, thermal
and electrical energy efficiency, and electricity decarbonisation. We find that,
apart from a slow trend of emissions reductions coming from technological im-
provements (first from a decrease in the clinker share, then from an increase
in alternative fuels), most of the emissions changes can be attributed to the
activity effect.
Using counterfactual scenarios, we estimate that the introduction of the EU
ETS brought small but positive technological abatement (2.2% ± 1.3% between
2005 and 2012). Moreover, we find that the European cement industry has
gained 3.5 billion Euros of “overallocation profits”, mostly due to the slowdown
of production.
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1. Introduction
Cement is the most widely-used man-made material in the world (Moya
et al., 2010), and also one of the most carbon-intensive products. The manufac-
ture of cement accounts for approximately 5% of global anthropogenic emissions
(IEA, 2009). China has the lion’s share of cement production with 58% of the
3,700 million tons produced in 2012. The European Union is now the third-
biggest producer with 5% of global production, behind India with 7% (U.S.
Geological Survey, 2013).
Since 2005 European cement emissions have been covered by the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), presented as Europe’s flagship pol-
icy to tackle climate change (Branger et al., 2013a). In this cap-and-trade sys-
tem, installations can buy or sell tradable allowances to attain emissions caps.
A key feature of the EU ETS, the question of whether allowances should be
auctioned or received free of charge (and in the latter case, what should be the
allocation plan, or the number of allowances per installation), has proved to be
a very controversial topic (Boemare and Quirion, 2002; Ellerman and Buchner,
2007). While most economists favored auctioning, the European Union opted
for almost completely free allocation for all sectors (industry and power sector)
during phase I (2005-2007) and phase II (2008-2012); and maintained completely
free (but declining at 1.74% per year) allocations1 in phase III (2013-2020) for
sectors “deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage”, and partly free for the rest
of manufacturing industry (European Commission, 2009).
Indeed, the main argument used to justify free allocation has been the
preservation of heavy industries’ competitiveness and the prevention of car-
bon leakage, which is a shift of emissions from carbon-constraint countries to
less carbon-constrained countries induced by asymmetric carbon pricing (Dröge,
2009). However, economic theory suggests that free allocation, if independent
from current production, is inefficient at preventing leakage in the short term
and would only provide a disincentive to plant relocation (Wooders et al., 2009).
In other words, in the short run free allocations would compensate firms for
profitability losses without addressing market share losses and carbon leakage
(Cook, 2011).
In addition to generous allocation caps, the economic downturn after 2008
led to a decrease in industrial production, which generated a large surplus of
allowances in the market. These financial assets have mainly been held by
cement and steel companies, because electricity demand has been much less
1Allocations in phase III are based on a product benchmark (the average of the 10% best
performing installations: 766kg CO2 per ton of clinker, the CO2-intensive intermediate prod-
uct required to produce cement), multiplied by a “cross sectoral correction factor” (0.9422 in
2013, declining by 1.74% per year), historical activity level (HAL, a formula leading approx-
imately to pre-crisis level of production), and an “activity level correction factor” (reducing
allocations by half or four if the plant is functioning below 50% or 25% of its HAL). Completely
free allocations are then maintained though the overall cap of allowances is less generous (it
has been reduced by 23% between 2012 and 2013) and declining. However because actual
production is much lower than pre-crisis level, 2013 emissions were 20% lower than the cap.
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impacted by the economic downturn.
Instead of suffering from financial losses, energy-intensive industries seem to
have thrived from the scheme. Sandbag, a non-governmental organization, has
estimated that the ten “carbon fat cats” have reaped billions of Euros in windfall
profits (Pearson, 2010). However, their analysis, based on the European Union
Transaction Log (EUTL) data, is based upon equivalence between allowances
surplus and overallocation, without considering the fact that some allowances
are obtained by reducing the carbon content of industrial products (Ellerman
and Buchner, 2008). Indeed, apart from financial outcomes, an important ques-
tion remains: whether the EU ETS has fulfilled its original purpose which was
to trigger a transition towards low-carbon industry.
Studies assessing abatement in the manufacturing industry have obtained
mixed results (Neuhoff et al., 2014). Zachman et al. (2011) find a significant
reduction in carbon intensity for basic metals (whose emissions occur mostly
in the steel sector) and non-metallic minerals (whose emissions occur mostly
in the cement sector) between 2007 and 2008 compared to 2005-2006. Yet
(Kettner et al., 2014) find very limited reduction in carbon intensity in the
cement and lime sector, and attribute most of it to an increase in clinker imports
– which implies carbon leakage. Moreover Egenhofer et al. (2011) find almost no
decrease in the manufacturing industry’s carbon intensity in 2008, which seems
to contradict Zachman et al. (2011) results.
In this paper, we propose to shed light on the questions of abatement and
overallocation in the European cement industry, exploiting EUTL data, Eu-
rostat international trade data, and the detailed and comprehensive Getting
the Numbers Right (GNR) database from the Cement Sustainability Initiative
(CSI). We perform an LMDI (Log Mean Divisia Index) decomposition (Ang,
2004) of emissions due to cement production in Europe. We measure the impact
of seven effects on emissions variations, which correspond to different mitiga-
tion levers: activity, clinker trade, clinker share, alternative fuel use, thermal
and electrical energy efficiency, and decarbonisation of electricity. This analysis
allows us to identify the key drivers behind changes in aggregated carbon emis-
sions, in the EU 27 as a whole and in six major European producers: Germany,
France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland.
A distinction can be made between the first two effects (activity and clinker
trade) that generate non-technological abatement and the others that generate
technological abatement. Making assumptions on counterfactual scenarios, we
estimate the technological abatement induced by the EU ETS and break down
its main factors. Furthermore, our emissions decomposition model allows us to
identify which part of the allowances surplus (allocations minus emissions) is due
to technological performance and which is due to a change in activity or clinker
outsourcing. We are then able to compute overallocation and “overallocation
profits”.
We find that the EU ETS has induced a small but positive abatement of
26 Mtons of CO2 (±16 Mtons) from 2005 to 2012 (corresponding to a 2.2% ±
1.3% decrease), mostly thanks to the reduction in the clinker-to-cement ratio.
However we cannot rule out another explanation, i.e. the massive increase in
3
steam coal and petcoke prices in the 2000s (Cembureau, 2012). This aggregate
figure hides important differences at national levels. Whereas technological
abatement has been important in Germany (5% ± 3%) and in the UK (4% ±
3%), it has been small in France, and insignificant or negative in Spain, Italy
and Poland. In addition, we estimate that the European cement industry has
reaped 3.5 billion Euros of overallocation profits during phases I and II. Most of
these profits come from the economic downturn that has reduced the demand
for cement and thus for cement production, in turn generating a massive surplus
of allowances.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 details the ce-
ment manufacturing process and the mitigation options. Section 3 explains the
emissions decomposition methodology. Section 4 applies this decomposition to
changes in emissions in the European cement industry from 1990 to 2012. Sec-
tion 5 is an assessment of technological abatement induced by the EU ETS and
of overallocation profits. Section 6 concludes.
2. Mitigation options in the cement industry
2.1. Cement manufacture at a glance
Cement manufacture can be divided into two main steps: clinker manufac-
ture, and blending and grinding clinker with other material to produce cement.
Clinker is produced by the calcination of limestone in a rotating kiln at 1450
degrees Celsius. Carbon dioxide is emitted in two ways. First, the chemical
reaction releases carbon dioxide (ca. 538 kgCO2 per ton of clinker2) which
accounts for roughly two thirds of carbon emissions in clinker manufacture.
The remaining CO2 comes from the burning of fossil fuel to heat the kiln. The
fuels used are mostly the cheapest ones, petcoke and coal (the use of gas and oil
is precluded by cost, except in some locations where they are very cheap, which
is not the case in the EU).
Raw material preparation, kiln operation, blending and grinding consume
electricity which causes indirect emissions. However, nearly all carbon emissions
(around 95%) in cement manufacture come from direct emissions in clinker
manufacture.
To reduce emissions from cement production3, various options are thus avail-
able:
2The process CO2 emission factor is generally considered as a fixed factor. However it is
slightly variable mainly because of the ratio of calcium carbonate and magnesium carbon-
ate in the limestone. When process emissions are actually measured, a narrow peak in the
distribution can be observed at 538 kgCO2 per ton of clinker (Ecofys et al. (2009) Figure
2). However, the factor used in the EU ETS Monitoring and Reporting of Greenhouse gas
emissions (MRG) is only 523 kgCO2 per ton of clinker, derived from IPCC methodology.
3If we consider cement consumption and not cement production, another option can be
added: cement outsourcing. We performed the same analysis for cement consumption with a
more complicated decomposition, adding cement trading. As the results barely changed (the
cement trading effect represented less than 3 Mtons of CO2 or 2% of emissions), for the sake
of simplicity we only retained the analysis of cement production.
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(i) Reduction of cement production, which may be due to reduced activ-
ity in the construction industry, to leaner structures or to the substitution of
alternative materials to cement.
(ii) Clinker substitution. Since clinker manufacture is the most carbon inten-
sive part of cement manufacture, partially substituting some other material for
clinker is an efficient way to reduce emissions per ton of cement produced. The
most common type of cement, ordinary Portland cement, is produced by mixing
95% of clinker and 5% of gypsum, but the clinker-to-cement ratio is lowered in
blended cements.
(iii) Clinker outsourcing. This is a way to reduce emissions within a given
geographical perimeter, but emissions then occur elsewhere, which causes carbon
leakage.
(iv) Alternative fuel use, which releases less CO2 for the same calorific value
produced.
(v) Energy efficiency, which can be divided into two parts, thermal energy
efficiency and electrical energy efficiency.
(vi) Decarbonisation of the electricity.
(vii) Carbon capture and storage.
(viii) Innovative cements, or carbon neutral cements based on totally differ-
ent processes.
The next section details these options, which do not have the same status.
Lever (i) is driven by cement demand and is not a direct choice made by cement
companies. Levers (ii) to (v) are operational options used by cement companies
(though lever (iii) does not reduce global emissions, it can be a rational choice
for a company covered by an emissions trading scheme). Lever (vi) is beyond
the scope of cement producers, and depends on electricity producers (which
have an incentive to use it when there is a price on carbon). Abatement due to
levers (i) to (vi) will be empirically assessed in this study. Levers (vii) and (viii)
are in the research and development stage. Though promising, these options
have not generated abatement yet.
The challenge of a non-global climate policy is to induce all these options
(except (iii)) without generating clinker or cement imports, which would lead
to carbon leakage.
2.2. Data sources
The work of this paper is based on the cross-referencing of three databases:
• the Getting the Numbers Right (GNR) database4 (WBCSD, 2009) devel-
oped by the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI), operating under the
World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
4http://wbcsdcement.org/GNR-2011/index.html. Variables have names we will refer to
for data sourcing. For example the clinker-to-cement ratio is variable 3213.
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• the European Union Transaction Log5 (EUTL) which is the registry of the
EU ETS, and provides allocations and verified emissions at the installation
level.
• the Eurostat international trade database6 for clinker trading.
The GNR database covered 94% of European cement production in 2012
(only minor producers with small production volumes are excluded), which is
remarkably high. Data are available7 for 1990, 2000, and 2005 to 2012. Data
can be obtained at the EU 28 level and at the national level for big producers
(so we have used data for Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland).
Although the GNR database contains data on production and emissions, we use
this database for its intensity (i.e. rate-based) indicators in the cement industry,
for reasons related to coverage and methodology (see part 3.1). A performance
indicator not included in GNR, the electricity emission factor, comes from the
Enerdata database8.
The cement sector is a subsector of the cement/lime EUTL sector (47% of
installations and 90% of allocations). We have collected plant-by-plant infor-
mation on 276 cement plants with kilns covered by the EU ETS. Some char-
acteristics of our cement EUTL database, which are in line with Table 1.2 in
European Commission (2010) and Table 4 in Moya et al. (2010)9, are given in
Table 1. The match between EUTL emissions and GNR gross direct emissions
5http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/napMgt.do
6http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/setupdimselection.do, EU Trade since 1988
by HS2, 4, 6 and CN8 dataset (extracted in February 2014). The code for clinker is 252310
(“cement clinkers”).
7Due to confidentiality reasons, there is a one year gap between data collection and publi-
cation. The latest data available (2012) were published in August 2014.
8http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/knowledge/subscriptions/database/energy-
market-data-and-co2-emissions-data.php
9Their list contains 268 installations in 2006 at the EU 27 level (compared to 270 for us
(Norway has two cement plants and Croatia four)). There are some discrepancies for France
(33 in instead of 30 for us), Germany (38 instead of 43), Italy (59 instead of 52), and some
other countries (1 plant difference). In Germany, geolocalization of plants revealed that three
plants had two EU ETS installations and 1 had three. Our list was cross-checked with the
Cemnet database (http://www.cemnet.com/GCR/), Sandbag database, and public reports of
major cement companies.
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is good but not perfect10. In addition, we use the Sandbag database11 for offset
credits utilization at the installation level.
Whereas total imports and exports are directly available in the Eurostat
international trade database at the EU 27 level, they have to be computed from
country-pairs raw data at the national level. Also, some corrections needed to
be made to take into account the changing geographical perimeter of the EU
ETS. Because they are absent from Eurostat, we used the Comtrade database12
for net imports in Norway, Iceland, and the EU 27 before 1999.
2.3. Clinker substitution
Reducing the clinker-to-cement ratio is a very efficient abatement option
since most of the carbon emissions are produced during clinker manufactur-
ing. The most-used clinker-substituting materials are fly ash (a residue from
coal-fired power stations), ground blast furnace slag (a by-product of the steel
industry), pozzolana (a volcanic ash) and limestone. Blast furnace cement of-
fers the highest potential for clinker reduction with a clinker-to-cement ratio of
5-64%, compared to pozzolanic cement (45-89%) and fly ash cement (65-94%)
(Moya et al., 2010).
Two barriers are impeding the deployment of blended cements. The first
is the regional availability of the clinker substitutes, or their price (since these
products have low value per ton, transportation costs are high). The phasing
out of coal-fired plants triggered by climate policy will make fly ash scarcer.
Ground blast depends on iron and steel production, and pozzolanas are present
only in certain volcanic regions (mainly Italy). Second, the physical proper-
ties of these alternative cements such as strength, colour and workability, and
their acceptance by construction contractors, constitute another barrier to their
implementation (IEA, 2009).
Figure 1 displays the clinker-to-cement ratio in 1990, 2000 and from 2005 to
2012 for the European Union (with 28 member states) and the six biggest cement
producers in Europe: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and
Poland. The average EU 28 clinker-to-cement ratio decreased from 78% in 1990
to 73% in 2012. The UK is the country for which the clinker-to-cement ratio
10GNR emissions are higher in the United Kingdom , Germany and Poland, (3% on av-
erage respectively for all) whereas they are lower Italy and at the EU 27 level (6% and 2%
respectively). France and Spain are perfect matches. Besides data-capture errors, differences
in emissions can occur for different reasons. First, there is a mismatch in installations covered.
GNR contains more plants because it includes grinding or blending plants, but some plants
with kilns are not covered, so emissions at the national level have to be extrapolated. Second,
accounting methodologies are different. Process emissions are measured in GNR (there is a
peak in the distribution at 538 kgCO2 per ton of clinker see figure 2 in (Ecofys et al., 2009))
whereas a default factor derived from IPCC methodology of 523 kgCO2 per ton of clinker is
used in the EU ETS. Non-kiln fuels are not reported in some countries for the EU ETS but
are (partially) reported in GNR. The carbon content of alternative fuels is also accounted for
differently.
11http://www.sandbag.org.uk/data/
12https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx
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Table 1: Cement EUTL database. Country level (Sandbag database used for offset credits)
Annual Allocation Annual Emissions Offset credits
Number of plants (MtonsCO2/year) (MtonsCO2/year) used (phase II)
Region Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Total % cap
EU ETS 254 262 158.3 178.6 153.8 131.1 88.6 10.0%
Germany 47 40 23.5 21.0 20.9 19.6 22.2 21.1%
France 30 30 14.1 15.3 14.3 12.5 10.1 13.3%
Spain 35 36 27.5 29.2 26.8 17.6 10.7 7.4%
United Kingdom 13 15 5.6 10.1 5.7 6.3 3.3 6.7%
Italy 52 54 26.2 28.0 27.8 21.1 10.0 7.2%
Poland 11 11 10.8 11.0 9.7 10.0 4.6 8.4%
Subtotal 189 187 108.2 115.0 105.8 87.5 61.2 10.6%
74% 71% 68% 64% 69% 66% 69%
Austria 9 9 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.6 1.2 9.2%
Greece 8 8 11.1 10.8 10.7 6.6 3.3 6.2%
Romania 7 7 2.3 9.3 2.2 5.1 4.3 9.3%
Czech Republic 6 5 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.5 1.4 10.0%
Portugal 6 6 6.8 6.7 6.6 5.1 3.3 10.0%
Belgium 5 5 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.3 1.0 4.0%
Bulgaria NP 5 NP 3.6 NP 1.9 2.1 11.5%
Hungary 4 5 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.4 0.9 8.4%
Ireland 4 4 3.6 4.0 3.8 2.1 2.2 11.0%
Slovakia 4 4 2.3 2.7 2.2 1.9 0.9 6.7%
Sweden 3 3 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.2 9.3%
Cyprus NP 2 NP 1.7 NP 0.9 0.8 9.3%
Finland 2 2 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.5 8.0%
Netherlands 1 1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 8.8%
Slovenia 2 2 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 12.1%
Denmark 1 1 2.8 2.6 2.7 1.7 0.8 6.5%
Estonia 1 1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.2 4.1%
Latvia 1 2 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.4 8.9%
Lithuania 1 1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 20.0%
Luxembourg 1 1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 10.0%
Norway NP 2 NP 1.3 NP 1.2 0.8 12.7%
Note:
NP is for Non Participating
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Figure 1: Clinker-to-cement ratio for the EU 28 and main European countries. Source:
WBCSD GNR Database, variable 3213
has decreased the most dramatically, from 95% in 1990 to 70% in 2012. In 2012
Germany was the country with the lowest clinker-to-cement ratio, 68%, whereas
Spain had the highest, 79%.
2.4. Clinker outsourcing
Clinker outsourcing is a drastic method to reduce carbon emissions within a
given geographical perimeter, but it does not in general reduce emissions on a
global scale (carbon intensity is approximately the same in Europe and abroad
and this adds emissions due to transportation). The increase in emissions abroad
due to a regional climate policy is called carbon leakage (Reinaud, 2008). In
the EU ETS, free allocation of allowances was presented as a way to mitigate
the risk of leakage.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the actual emissions reductions in the
cement industry, and not to provide a technology roadmap. Therefore just be-
cause clinker outsourcing is an undesirable option does not mean that it should
not be considered in this context. Under the EU ETS, it can be profitable since,
provided that a certain level of activity is maintained, the operator of an instal-
lation keeps receiving free allowances that can be sold on the market. However,
logistical difficulties, high transportation costs and export barriers make clinker
outsourcing less appealing than it appears. Clinker trading primarily occurs in
the case of over- or under-capacity (Cook, 2011). Geography plays an impor-
tant role: high road transport costs exclude inland producers from international
trade (Ponssard and Walker, 2008).
Figure 2 shows clinker net imports (imports minus exports) divided by
clinker production. The EU 27 switched from being a clinker importer to being
a clinker exporter in 2009. We can see that clinker is a poorly traded commod-
ity: since 1990 net extra-EU27 imports or exports have never been more than
9
Figure 2: Net imports (imports minus exports) of clinker relative to local clinker production.
Sources: Eurostat for net imports, EUTL and WBCSD GNR Database for production
Figure 3: Origin of the EU 27 net imports. West Mediterranean comprises Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia and Libya. Source: Eurostat
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7% of its production. Imports came from Asia (mostly China and Thailand)
and the East Mediterranean region especially between 2001 and 2005 (mainly
Turkey and Egypt), and since 2010 European clinker has mainly been exported
to the Gulf of Guinea and Brazil (see Figure 3). The European country with
the most remarkable trajectory is Spain, which turned into a massive clinker
exporter (20% of its production in 2012) after being a massive importer (up
to 34% of its production in 2007). This swing can be explained by the boom
and burst of the construction bubble. Further, most of the surge of clinker ex-
ports in 2012 compared to 2011 can be attributed to phase III allocation rules13
(Branger et al., 2014).
2.5. Alternative fuel use
The conventional fossil fuels used in clinker manufacture, coal and petcoke,
have a high carbon intensity. Replacing these fuels by alternative, less carbon
intensive fuels generates abatement. The proportion of alternative fuel used
in thermal energy production has increased steadily in the European Union.
Fossil and mixed wastes14, which are generally less carbon-intensive than coal
or petcoke, represented 2% of thermal energy in 1990, 11% in 2005 and 25% in
201215. Biomass represented16 0.2% of thermal energy in 1990, 4% in 2005 and
11% in 201217. Most cement companies receive a fee for the burning of waste as
part of a waste management strategy to reduce incineration and landfilling; so
using alternative fuel may be financially advantageous regardless of the carbon
price.
The carbon intensity of the fuel mix (shown in Figure 4) has decreased from
94 kgCO2/GJ in 199018 to 80kgCO2/GJ in 2012. In 2012, Germany had the
lowest carbon intensity of the fuel mix by far (71 kgCO2/GJ), while Italy had
the highest (89 kgCO2/GJ).
Much higher substitution rates are possible than the currently-used mixes
but several factors limit the potential of alternative fuel use. First, the calorific
value of most organic material is relatively low, and treatment of side products
(such as chlorine) is sometimes needed (European Commission, 2010). Second,
the availability of waste is dependent on the local waste legislation and collection
network as well as nearby industrial activity (IEA, 2009). Third, a higher CO2
price may increase the global demand for biomass, for which cement companies
13Allowances are cut by half if the plant produces less than half of its historical activity level.
This encouraged plants to overproduce to reach the threshold. Excess clinker production has
then been exported or blended in cement, increasing the clinker-to-cement ratio.
14Mostly plastics, mixed industrial waste, and tyres in 2012 (respectively 43%, 20% and
17% (source: GNR database, variable 3211detail).
15GNR database, variable 3211a.
16Mostly animal meal and dried sewage sludge: respectively 49% and 20% (source: GNR
database, variable 3211detail).
17GNR database, variable 3211a.
18For this value only, we took the average of European country values weighted by their
cement production. Indeed, the original GNR value (91 kgCO2/GJ) was lower than all values
corresponding to individual European countries .
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Figure 4: Carbon intensity of the fuel mix (in kgCO2/GJ) for the EU 28 and main European
countries. Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 3221
compete with heat and electricity producers. This would increase its price and
make it less appealing as a fuel substitute for the cement industry. Finally,
social acceptance is of huge relevance as incineration is often viewed with great
suspicion by surrounding inhabitants.
2.6. Thermal and electrical energy efficiency
Cement manufacture requires both thermal energy for heating the clinker
kiln and electrical energy (about 10% of total energy needed) mostly for kiln
operation, grinding (preparing raw materials) and blending (mixing clinker with
additives). The proportion of total electrical energy used for these steps is
respectively 25%, 33% and 30% according to Schneider et al. (2011).
New kilns using raw material in powder form (dry production route) are
much more energy efficient than old kilns using raw material in a slurry (wet
production route) since less heat is needed to dry the raw material19 (3-4 GJ
per ton of clinker instead of 5-6 GJ per ton of clinker in European Commission
(2010)). In modern kilns, part of the heat of the exhaust gases from the kiln is
recovered to pre-heat the raw material (pre-heaters) (Pardo et al., 2011). The
state-of-the art technology is the dry process kiln with pre-heating and pre-
calcining, which requires approximately 3 GJ per ton of clinker and accounts
for 46% of European clinker production in 2012 (compared to 23% in 199020).
In addition to kiln technology, kiln capacity also influences energy efficiency.
Bigger kilns have lower heat losses per unit of clinker produced and are therefore
19It is common in the literature to distinguish four routes for cement manufacture: dry,
semi-dry, semi-wet and wet (GNR).
20Source: GNR database, variable Percent315.
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Figure 5: Thermal energy intensity in GJ per ton of clinker for the EU 28 and main European
countries. Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 329.
more energy-efficient. Finally, for a given installation, the way the machinery is
operated (minimizing kiln shutdowns and operating near to nominal capacity)
can make a significant difference (about 0.15-0.3 GJ per ton of clinker according
to Hoenig and Twigg (2009)).
Cement producers benefit directly from energy efficiency through lower en-
ergy costs, which represent roughly a third of production costs (Bolscher et al.,
2013; Pardo et al., 2011). Generally, new manufacturing plants are equipped
with the best available technology, but the upgrading of old facilities is a slow
process. Moya et al. (2011) find that the observed rate of retrofitting in the ce-
ment industry is much lower than the theoretical rate derived from the number
of feasible improvements with low payback periods, revealing an “energy effi-
ciency gap” (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994) or “energy efficiency paradox” (deCanio,
1998).
Figures 5 and 6 show the thermal energy intensity and the electrical energy
intensity, respectively in GJ per ton of clinker and in kWh per ton of cement.
The thermal energy intensity in the EU 28 decreased from 4.1 GJ per ton of
clinker in 1990 to 3.7 GJ per ton of clinker in 2005 then stabilized. The electrical
energy intensity in the EU 28, after decreasing from 114 kWh per ton of cement
in 1990 to 108 kWh per ton of cement in 2006 increased to 116 kWh per ton of
cement in 2012. The most noticeable change comes from Spain where average
electricity intensity soared from 98 kWh/ton of cement in 2006 to 150kWh per
ton of cement in 2012, probably due to the decrease in production which led to
the use of machinery operating well below nominal capacity21.
21Spanish cement production was divided by three in the same period. To understand such
a dramatic increase, whereas in the same time thermal energy intensity has not evolved, two
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Figure 6: Electrical energy intensity in kWh per ton of cement for the EU 28 and main
European countries. Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 3212.
There are no breakthrough technologies in sight that would allow a signif-
icant decrease in kiln energy consumption (European Commission, 2010), so
the potential for abatement is small. In addition, the other abatement drivers
can be negatively correlated to energy efficiency. Clinker substitutes (especially
blast furnace slag) generally require more energy for grinding, and alternative
fuels may provide less calorific power or may need more energy to treat by-
products. Moreover, more stringent environmental requirements (dust and gas
treatment), increased cement performance (necessitating finer grinding) and kiln
improvements such as pre-heaters and pre-calciners have led to higher power
consumption (Hoenig and Twigg, 2009). These reasons could explain why en-
ergy efficiency has stabilized or deteriorated in recent years.
2.7. Decarbonisation of electricity
For the sake of simplicity in this study we consider that all the electricity
consumed comes from the grid22. In this context, this mitigation option does not
depend on the cement industry but on electricity producers. Indirect electricity
emissions represent around 6% of total emissions in the cement industry. Under
the EU ETS framework, these emissions are attributed to electricity producers
and not to cement manufacturers. Cement companies do not receive allowances
explanations can be proposed. First, contrary to kiln fuel which is fully variable, there is a
higher share of “non-productive” electric energy (such as lighting, heating, water pumping
and compressed air). Second, some plants have several kilns, so production can be redirected
to the most efficient ones only. Conversely, most plants have only one grinder.
22The number of plants recovering heat for power generation is unknown (Matthes et al.,
2008). Self-generation of power is more frequent in countries where electricity supply is not
reliable (VDZ (German Cement Association), 2013).
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Figure 7: Electricity emission factor (in kgCO2/MWh) for the EU 27 and main European
countries. Source: Enerdata database
for these emissions and neither do they have to surrender allowances for them.
However, they may face indirect costs through the rise in electricity prices due to
the passing-through of allowance prices. Though small, this abatement option
still has the potential to decrease total emissions in the cement industry.
Figure 7 shows the changes in the electricity emissions factor (in kgCO2/MWh).
It has globally decreased in all European countries, and the EU 27 average
dropped from 474 kgCO2/MWh in 1990 to 339 kg CO2/MWh. In 2012, the
country with the highest electricity emissions factor was Poland with 680 kgCO2/MWh
(because of the predominance of coal power) and the country with the lowest
was France with 69 kgCO2/MWh (because of the high proportion of nuclear
and hydro-electric power).
2.8. Carbon capture and storage
Most carbon emissions from cement manufacturing are process emissions due
to the chemical reaction during limestone calcination. The only way to avoid
these emissions (apart from alternative cements based on different chemical
processes) would be carbon capture and storage (CCS) using post-combustion
technologies. Emissions due to burning of fossil fuels could also be managed with
CCS technologies. A promising option in this direction is oxyfuel technology
where air is replaced by oxygen in cement kilns to produce a pure CO2 stream
that is easier to handle (Barker et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013).
R&D in CCS is active but these potentially promising technologies are far
from being operational at the industrial scale (Moya et al., 2010). A high carbon
price (estimations vary but an order of magnitude is 50e/tonCO2) would be
necessary to trigger investments in this medium-term option. Furthermore,
CCS technologies are energy-intensive and would increase power consumption
significantly (by 50% to 120% at plant level according to Hoenig and Twigg
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(2009)). Finally, their large-scale development would necessitate a complete
CCS system, including transport infrastructure, access to storage sites, a legal
framework for CO2 transportation, monitoring and verification, and therefore
political and social acceptance (IEA, 2009).
2.9. Innovative cements
Several low-carbon or even carbon-negative cements are at the development
stage, such as Novacem (based on magnesium silicates rather than limestone),
Calera or Geopolymer (Schneider et al., 2011). Providing they prove their eco-
nomic viability and gain customer acceptance (which is extremely challenging
in itself), replacing existing facilities would require considerable time and in-
vestment.
2.10. Cement substitution in construction
This option, aimed at reducing the overall quantity of cement produced,
depends on architects and construction companies. Like decarbonisation of
electricity, it depends on other stakeholders. Whereas cement companies are
indifferent to the carbon content of electricity (for a given electricity price), a
reduction in quantities of cement used in construction is at first sight against
the interests of the cement industry.
Reducing quantities of cement used in construction would be possible through
alternative materials and/or leaner structures. Wood would be the most nat-
ural alternative construction material to cement, provided that its large-scale
availability could be assured.
3. Methodology
Thus far, we have presented the emission abatement options qualitatively or
on the basis of simple indicators. Quantifying their respective contribution in
the evolution of cement CO2 emissions requires a decomposition method, which
we describe in the next section.
3.1. Decomposition of carbon emissions due to cement production
In the rest of this section, C stands for emissions, Q for quantities and E
for energy consumption. The definition of all the variables used can be found
in Table 2.
We distinguish QPRODclinker,t which is the quantity of clinker produced at year
t and QNETclinker,t which is the quantity of clinker actually used for cement man-
ufacture. The difference between the two comes from international trade (we
neglect stock variations):
QNETclinker,t = QPRODclinker,t +NIclinker,t (1)
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NIclinker,t being net imports of clinker. We split emissions into three categories:
emissions due to fuel burning (subscript F ), process emissions (subscript P ) and
indirect emissions due to electricity consumption (subscript E):
Ct = CF,t + CP,t + CE,t (2)
Only direct emissions are accounted for in the EU ETS.
CEUTL,t = CF,t + CP,t (3)
First, emissions due to fuel burning, CF,t, can be decomposed as follows:
CF,t =Qcement,t
QNETclinker,t
Qcement,t
QPRODclinker,t
QNETclinker,t
ET,clinker,t
QPRODclinker,t
CF,t
ET,clinker,t
= Qcement,t ×Rt ×Ht × IT,t × CEFF,t
(4)
where ET,clinker,t is the thermal energy used, Rt the clinker-to-cement ratio,
Ht is the clinker home production ratio (Ht > 1 if more clinker is produced
than used, or, put another way, if net imports are negative), IT,t is the thermal
energy intensity (in GJ per ton of clinker) and CEFF,t is the carbon intensity
of the fuel mix (in tCO2/GJ).
The formulation for process emissions CP,t is:
CP,t =Qcementt
QNETclinker,t
Qcement,t
QPRODclinker,t
QNETclinker,t
CP,t
QPRODclinker,t
= Qcement,t ×Rt ×Ht × CEFpro
(5)
where CEFpro is the CO2 emission factor for the calcination of limestone
which is considered here time invariant, absent any information on its evolution.
The formulation for CE,t is:
CE,t =Qcement,t
EE,t
Qcement,t
CE,t
EE,t
= Qcement,t × IEl,t × CEFelec,t
(6)
where ET,clinker,t is the electrical energy used, IEl,t is the electrical energy
intensity of production (in MWh per ton of cement) and CEFelec,t is the elec-
tricity emission factor (in tCO2/MWh).
Total emissions of cement manufacturing are then
Ct = Qcement,t×(Rt×Ht×(CEFpro+IT,t×CEFF,t)+IEl,t×CEFelec,t) (7)
Abatement levers are more visible in this formula that is composed only of
positive terms: besides reducing activity (reducing Qcement,t) or outsourcing
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clinker (reducing Ht), technological abatement options are reducing Rt (clinker
substitution), CEFF,t (alternative fuel use), IT,t and IEl,t (thermal and electri-
cal energy efficiency), and reducing CEFelec,t (decarbonisation of electricity).
For the data, we have taken directly from GNR the intensity variables Rt
(variable 3213), CEFF,t (variable 3221), IT,t (variable 329) and IEl,t (vari-
able 3212). These data are given at the EU 28 level (whereas we focus on
the EU 27 level) but the error is low since they are intensity variables, and
Croatia’s cement production accounts for less than 2% of EU 28 cement pro-
duction (Mikulčić et al., 2013). CEFelec,t comes from the Enerdata database
and CEFpro from Ecofys et al. (2009) (we take, unless explicitly mentioned
otherwise, the measured value from the GNR database, 538 kgCO2 per ton of
clinker, rather than the default factor of 523 kgCO2 per ton of clinker derived
from the IPCC methodology used in the EU ETS).
Ht and Qcement,t are obtained indirectly by computation. The quantity
of clinker produced is obtained by dividing EUTL emissions23 by the clinker
carbon intensity (using the EU ETS value of CEFpro):
QPRODclinker,t =
CEUTL,t
CEFpro + IT,t × CEFF,t =
CEUTL,t
CkCIt
(8)
where CkCIt is the clinker carbon intensity. Then Ht is given by:
Ht =
QPRODclinker,t
QPRODclinker,t +NIclinker,t
(9)
whereNIclinker,t comes from the Eurostat international trade database. Qcement,t
is obtained by:
Qcement,t =
QPRODclinker,t +NIclinker,t
Rt
(10)
Computing indirectly clinker and cement production (whereas they are avail-
able in the GNR database) is a modelling choice. Indeed, equation (7) is a
perfect accounting equality, but in practice there are always mismatches due to
data inaccuracy, and so one variable has to be computed through the equation
(instead of coming from data source). The choice of which variable to compute
is determined by the quality of the data and the use of the decomposition. In our
case we have a choice between using GNR data on clinker and cement production
and compute emissions, or using EUTL emissions data for direct emissions and
compute clinker and cement production. We chose the second option for two
23Sometimes EUTL emissions do not exist (before 2005) or are not reliable: for the EU 27
in phase I, because some countries were not covered, and for the UK in phase I, because of
the opt-out condition, some plants were not part of the scheme. In these cases we use GNR
direct emissions, corrected by a factor to take into account the discrepancy between GNR
and EUTL emissions. The factor is 2005-2010 EUTL emissions divided by 2005-2010 GNR
emissions (we take the period 2008-2010 for the EU 27 and the UK).
19
Figure 8: Cement production in million tons for the EU 27 (right vertical axis) and the main
European countries (left vertical axis). Source: Computation from WBCSD GNR Database,
EUTL database and Eurostat International Database
reasons. First, it allows finding EUTL emissions after recalculation for direct
emissions, and EUTL emissions are extremely reliable: the coverage is 100%,
and it comes from a compulsory policy rather than a voluntary program. GNR
coverage is good but not perfect (some clinker plants are missing and grinding
plants using imported clinker may not be covered). As an example, in Spain in
2007 (the country-year with the highest clinker importation), the GNR database
gives a production of 46.8 Mt of cement, whereas our own computation (with
11.0 Mt of clinker net imports) gives 55.4 Mt, which are closer to the official
figure of the Spanish cement association: 54.7 Mt (Oficemen, 2013). Second, it
allows decomposing the exact allowances surplus and not an approximation of it
(see section 5.3). Anyway, the difference between computed clinker production
and reported GNR data at the EU level is small and stable over time24. So,
given the order of magnitude of changes in the overall production, and because
we are more interested in relative changes than absolute values, using one or
the other would have hardly any impact on results of section 4.
3.2. LMDI method
Index decomposition analysis (IDA) has been widely used in studies dealing
with energy consumption since the 1980s and carbon emissions since the 1990s.
24Computed production is higher than GNR data by about 3-4% for clinker and 6-7%
for cement. Two reasons could explain the difference: the coverage (as coverage is around
95%, GNR underestimate cement production by about 5%) and white clinker. White clinker,
which represents a tiny fraction of clinker production, is more carbon-intensive (by around
30%) than grey clinker. GNR intensity variables mostly concern grey clinker only, whereas
EUTL emissions do not distinguish grey and white clinker. This introduces an upward bias
in computed production. The higher the proportion of white clinker, the higher the bias; and
the bias is stable in time if the proportion of white clinker production remains stable.
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Ang (2004) compares different IDA methods and concludes that the Logarithm
Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) is to be preferred. A comprehensive literature
survey reviewing 80 IDA studies dealing with emissions decomposition is given
in Xu and Ang (2013), and shows that the LMDI became the standard method
after 2007.
The general formulation of LMDI (see Ang (2005)) is the following. When
emissions can be decomposed as Ct = X1 × X2 × · · · × Xn, the variation of
emissions ∆tot = CT − C0 can be decomposed as ∆tot = ∆1 + ∆2 + · · · + ∆n,
with
∆k = CT − C0ln(CT )− ln(C0) × ln(
XkT
Xk0
) (11)
LMDI decomposition is mostly used to study the difference in emissions
between two dates for a given country, but the mathematical formulation also
works for difference in emissions for two countries at a given date, or (as we will
see later), for difference in emissions for a given country between a real and a
counterfactual or reference scenario.
Among the 34 studies since 2002 using LMDI decomposition analysis in Xu
and Ang (2013) literature review, the majority (14) are economy-wide and only
seven focus on industry. But except for Sheinbaum et al. (2010) (iron and steel
in Mexico), they are not sector-specific but deal with industry or the manufac-
turing sector as a whole; in China (Liu and Ang, 2007; Chen, 2011), Shanghai
(Zhao et al., 2010), Chongqin (Yang and Chen, 2010), the UK (Hammond and
Norman, 2012) or Thailand (Bhattacharyya and Ussanarassamee, 2004). For
sector specific studies (not using the LMDI method), one can cite two interna-
tional comparisons for cement (Kim and Worrell, 2002a) and steel (Kim and
Worrell, 2002b) and a study of the iron and steel industry in Mexico (Ozawa,
2002).
The study closest to ours is Xu et al. (2012), which was not cited in Xu and
Ang (2013), focusing on the cement industry in China. They give a decompo-
sition per kiln type, allowing the energy efficiency effect to be separated into
a structural effect (change of kiln type) and a kiln efficiency effect25. However
they do not consider clinker trade in their decomposition, which is arguably of
little importance for China, but matters for Europe.
Expanding equation (7) leads to the following decomposition:
∆tot = CT − C0
= 4act−F +4sha−F +4tra−F +4fmix +4eff−F
+4act−P +4sha−P +4tra−P
+4act−E +4eff−E +4Celec
= 4act +4sha +4tra +4fmix +4eff−F +4eff−E +4Celec
(12)
25Kiln energy intensity over time per kiln type was not available in the GNR database, so
we opted for a simpler decomposition.
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performing the appropriate groupings: 4act = 4act−F +4act−P +4act−E ,
4tra = 4tra−F +4tra−P and 4sha = 4sha−F +4sha−P .
The precise formulas are all given in the Appendix.
There are then seven factors in the decomposition:
• The activity effect (4act): impact of total cement production on emissions
variations. It corresponds to lever (i) in part 2.1
• The clinker trade effect (4tra): impact of the clinker trade on emissions
variations. It corresponds to lever (iii) in part 2.1.
• The clinker share effect (4sha): impact of clinker substitution on emis-
sions variations. It corresponds to lever (ii) in part 2.1.
• The fuel mix effect (4fmix): impact of the use of alternative fuel on
emissions variations. It corresponds to lever (iv) in part 2.1.
• The thermal and electrical energy efficiency effect (4eff−F and 4eff−E):
impact of thermal and electrical energy efficiency. They correspond to
lever (v) in part 2.1.
• The electricity carbon emissions factor effect (4Celec): impact of the car-
bon emissions factor on emissions variations. It corresponds to lever (vi)
in part 2.1.
One can distinguish the first two effects (activity and clinker trade) which are
“non-technological” abatement options from the others that are technological
abatement options.
4. Changes in carbon emissions in the European cement industry
4.1. EU 27
Figure 9 shows changes in carbon emissions over time compared to their
1990 level alongside the LMDI decomposition analysis explained above 26.
Emissions in the cement industry first decreased in the 1990s and the begin-
ning of the 2000s (-4.7% from 1990 to 2005) then increased sharply to exceed
the 1990 level (+3.6% in 2007 compared to 1990). The economic recession led
to a sharp decrease in emissions: in 2009 they were 25.1% lower than in 1990
(which corresponds to a 29.1% reduction in emissions in two years) and kept
decreasing slowly afterwards.
The LMDI analysis allows us to highlight the fact that most of the emissions
variations in the EU 27 are attributable to the activity effect: cement emissions
have increased or decreased mostly because more or less cement has been pro-
duced. The activity effect was responsible for an increase of 41.5 Mtons of CO2
26In the graphic we display variations from 1990 (fixed date) to year i. To compute variations
between years i and j, we only have to take the differences, as the decomposition is linear and
4i,j = Ci − Cj = Ci − C1990 − (Cj − C1990) = 4i,1990 −4j,1990
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Figure 9: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. EU 27
in 2007 compared to 1990 (+22.7%) and for a decrease of 64.5 Mtons of CO2
two years later (corresponding to a 34.2% decrease).
At the European level, the clinker trade effect partially compensates the
activity effect most of the time: it is negative when the activity effect is positive
and vice-versa. Put differently, a production increase is accompanied by an
increase in clinker net imports and a production decrease by a decrease in clinker
net imports, which can be explained by production capacity constraints (Cook,
2011). Keeping 1990 as the reference level, the clinker trade effect was at its
highest in 2007 when clinker net imports reached 14.1 Mtons. At this time,
12.8 Mtons of CO2 (7% of 1990 emissions) were avoided in Europe because of
clinker outsourcing. With the economic downturn and the decrease in overall
production, clinker net imports dropped and Europe became a clinker exporter
in 2009. Between 2007 and 2010, while the activity effect led to a decrease of
69.2 Mtons of CO2, the change in the balance of the clinker trade was responsible
for an increase of 13.9 Mtons of CO2 in Europe.
The two most important levers of technological emissions reduction are
clinker substitution and alternative fuel use. The clinker share effect led to
a reduction of 5.4 Mtons of CO2 in 2005 compared to 1990 (-3.0%) and an ex-
tra 5.9 Mtons in 2012 compared to 2005 (-3.4%). Alternative fuel use led to a
reduction of 1.9 Mtons of CO2 in 2005 compared to 1990 (-1.0%) and an extra
reduction of 5.1 Mtons between 2005 and 2012 (-2.9%).
Thermal energy efficiency was the most important driver of emissions reduc-
tion in the 1990s: between 1990 and 2000, it induced a decrease of 5.7 Mtons
of CO2 (-3.2%). Since then, thermal energy efficiency in Europe has stagnated,
generating no extra emissions reduction. The electrical energy efficiency effect
has by far the least influence. It led to 0.5 Mtons of CO2 of emissions reduction
between 1990 and 2005. Then a deterioration in electrical energy efficiency led
to an increase of 0.7 Mtons of CO2 between 2005 and 2012. There are two
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possible explanations for the stagnation of thermal energy efficiency and the
deterioration of electrical energy efficiency in the 2000s. First, kilns were oper-
ating below capacity and thus below their optimal efficiency level. Second, the
two other main abatement options (clinker reduction and alternative fuel use)
may reduce energy efficiency (see part 2.6).
Finally, the electricity carbon emissions factor effect has had a progressive
impact in reducing cement emissions, globally small but not negligible. This
channel of emissions reduction, which has the particular characteristic of de-
pending on other stakeholders than the cement industry itself, was responsible
for a decrease of 2.5 Mtons of CO2 between 1990 and 2000 and 0.9 Mtons of
CO2 between 2000 and 2012 (-1.4% then -0.5%).
These observations can be summarised as follows. Clinker substitution, al-
ternative fuel use, and to a lesser extent decarbonisation of electricity, have
brought a continuous decrease in carbon emissions over the past twenty years
(respectively 11.3, 7.0 and 3.3 Mtons of CO2 between 1990 and 2012, i.e. 6.2%,
3.8% and 1.8% reduction). Together they are responsible for a 11.9% decrease
in carbon emissions. Energy efficiency induced a decrease in emissions in the
1990s (5.7 Mtons of CO2 or -3.2% between 1990 and 2000) then a small increase,
probably because of clinker share reduction and alternative fuel use. Overall it
was responsible for 4.7 Mtons of emissions reductions between 1990 and 2012
(-2.6%). Apart from this long-time slow trend of emissions reduction, most of
the emissions fluctuations are explained by the activity effect, which is partially
compensated for by the clinker trade effect.
4.2. Main European producers
Figures 10 to 15 show information, using the same graphical format, for the
biggest European cement producers: Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy
and Poland. We do not give such a detailed analysis for each country as for the
EU 27 but only highlight the most salient facts.
• Germany. Germany shows that it is feasible to decrease significantly emis-
sions intensity. Clinker substitution and alternative fuel use have allowed
significant emissions reductions (-23% between 1990 and 2012). Moreover,
Germany was exporting clinker at the peak of economic activity in 2007
while EU 27 as a whole was importing it. It is the only big Western Euro-
pean country which did not have a sharp decrease in cement production.
Cement production was only 2% lower in 2012 than in 1990, while carbon
emissions were 27% lower.
• France. France reduced emissions while making virtually no technologi-
cal improvement between 2000 and 2012. In the 1990s the cement French
market got consolidated (only four companies were in activity in 2005, con-
trary to Germany, Italy and Spain where the market is more fragmented),
which involved many plant closures. This could explain why the activity
effect and the clinker trade effect did not move in opposite directions be-
tween 1990 and 2000 (the decrease in cement production, around 20%, by
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Figure 10: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. Germany
far more important than its European counterparts, was accompanied by
a rise in clinker net imports). The clinker share effect, after being respon-
sible for an increase in emissions until 2006, brought emissions reductions
afterwards, returning approximately to its 1990 level, whereas in most
European countries (except Italy ) it has been a continuous source of sig-
nificant emissions reductions. Energy efficiency, which was the best among
the big Western European countries in 1990, has deteriorated continuously
and led to an increase in emissions. The biggest source of emissions re-
duction, alternative fuel use, was only applied in the 1990s: hardly any
improvement was achieved afterwards.
• Spain. Spanish cement emissions are overwhelmingly affected by the activ-
ity effect and the clinker trade effect. At the highest point of the housing
bubble in 2007, the activity effect would have doubled emissions (+105%)
compared to 1990, but was partially compensated for by the clinker trade
effect (-42%). The bursting of the housing bubble led to a massive reduc-
tion in cement production and therefore of emissions through the activity
effect, which was partially offset by a massive reduction in clinker net im-
ports, and an increase in the clinker-to-cement ratio. Still, some emissions
reduction was achieved by alternative fuel use (especially since 2010), ther-
mal energy efficiency, and electricity decarbonisation, bringing altogether
7.8% of emissions reductions in 2012 compared to 1990.
• UK. In 1990 the UK cement industry was the most CO2-intensive in West-
ern Europe. However, twenty years later it was one of the best performers.
The reduction of the exceptionally high clinker-to-cement ratio (94% in
1990) down to 70% in 2012 led to massive emissions reductions (a 18% de-
crease compared to 1990). Other levers of emissions reduction such as en-
ergy efficiency and alternative fuel use were applied to a significant extent.
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Figure 11: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. France
Figure 12: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. Spain
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Figure 13: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. the UK
On top of all these factors, the economic downturn led to a considerable
decrease in emissions in 2008 and 2009 with a small rebound afterwards
(whereas the activity effect was responsible for a small increase in emis-
sions in 2005-2007). Overall, the UK is the major European country with
the biggest fall in emissions in 2012 compared to 1990 (-58%, compared to
-25% in Germany, -34% in France, -40% in Italy, -23% in Spain and -6%
in Poland).
• Italy. Like France, Italy had good environmental indicators in 1990 such as
the lowest clinker-to-cement ratio and a relatively low carbon intensity of
the fuel mix. While being a major source of emissions reductions in other
countries, the clinker share effect led to an increase in emissions in Italy,
because of the increase in the clinker-to-cement ratio in the 1990s and
its stabilization in the 2000s. Moreover, since 2000, barely any progress
has been made in energy efficiency and alternative fuel use. The activity
effect has had a qualitatively similar impact as in the UK (as Italy pro-
duces approximately twice as much cement, the effect is twice as small in
percentage terms). Overall, the 40% emissions reduction compared since
1990 is almost entirely explained by the activity effect.
• Poland. Unlike the other European countries, Poland has had a sustained
increase in production (only slightly hit by the recession). In 2012 the
activity effect was responsible for a 27% increase in emissions compared
to 1990. Most of this increase was compensated for by other sources of
emissions reductions, explaining why emissions decreased by 6% in 2012
compared to 1990. The biggest contribution to emissions reduction was
from energy efficiency, mostly in the 1990s, but clinker substitution and
alternative fuel have had a significant impact.
27
Figure 14: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. Italy
Figure 15: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to 1990. Poland
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Figure 16: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emission variations in the EU 27, before
and after the beginning of the EU ETS (2000-2005 and 2005-2012)
5. Impact of the EU ETS on the cement industry
5.1. Overview
Figure 16 shows the results of the LMDI decomposition before (2000 and
2005) and after (2005-2012) the launch of the EU ETS.
Between 2000 and 2005, cement industry emissions increased by 0.7%, whereas
between 2005 and 2012 they dropped by 24.9%. This gives the impression that
the EU ETS was extremely efficient at reducing emissions. However, the LMDI
analysis shows that the activity effect itself accounts for 25.9% of emissions
reduction between 2005 and 2012, compensated for by a 7.2% increase in the
clinker trade effect. This decrease in clinker net imports is essentially due to
weak domestic demand leading to production overcapacity.
Among the technological abatement options, between 2005 and 2012, the
clinker share effect, the fuel mix effect and the decarbonisation of electricity
led to emission reductions of 3.8%, 2.9%, and 0.4% respectively, compensated
for by a 0.4% increase due to the energy efficiency effect. Before the beginning
of the EU ETS, between 2000 and 2005, the clinker share effect, the fuel mix
effect, the carbon emissions factor effect and the energy efficiency effect led to
emissions reductions of 2.0%, 1.2%, 0.3%, and 0.4% respectively.
It would thus seem that the introduction of the EU ETS may have, to a
small extent, accelerated the use of clinker substitution, alternative fuel use and
decarbonisation of electricity27, while these mitigation options may have led to
27Though most of the decarbonisation of electricity may be due to renewable subsidies
rather than the EU ETS itself (Weigt et al., 2013).
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a decrease in energy efficiency.
Figure 16 does not show abatement but simply changes in emissions over
time. Abatement is the difference between actual emissions and counterfactual
emissions, which would have occurred if the EU ETS had not existed. Quan-
titative estimation of the abatement due to the EU ETS therefore necessitates
the construction of a counterfactual scenario. The methodology and results are
given in the next section.
5.2. Abatement
The method has three stages. First, we produce two counterfactual sce-
narios making assumptions about the different parameters of the emissions de-
composition detailed in section 3.1. Second, we compute the difference Crealt −
Ccounterfactt for each year, then decompose it through an LMDI decomposition
analysis. Third, we add the different yearly effects and analyse the different
levers of abatement. In this section and the next one, we consider the geo-
graphically changing EU ETS perimeter28 instead of the EU 27, as we study
the impact of the EU ETS on the cement industry.
For the counterfactual scenario, we assume that both the quantity of ce-
ment produced (Qcounterfactcement,t = Qcement,t), and the home production ratio
(Hcounterfactt = Ht) remain unchanged. The EU ETS may have led to greater
levels of production after the economic recession because of the allowance allo-
cation method (which discourages plant closure); or conversely to lower levels
of production because of cement substitution (lever (i)), loss of competitive-
ness and leakage incentives (which have not been empirically proven so far, see
Branger et al. (2013b)); but these effects are likely to be small.
For the other variables, Rt, the clinker-to-cement ratio, CEFF,t the carbon
intensity of the fuel mix, IEn,t, the thermal energy intensity of production, IEl,t,
the electrical energy intensity of production and CEFelec,t, the electricity emis-
sion factor; we consider two counterfactual scenarios. In the “Freeze” scenario,
the variables keep their 2005 values from 2005 to 2012. In the “Trend” sce-
nario, the variables decrease (or increase) at the same rate as the average yearly
variation between 2000 and 200529.
As an example, let us consider a given country for which the clinker-to-
cement ratio is 80% in 2000 and 77% in 2005 (which corresponds to an average
decrease of 0.8% per year). In the “Freeze” scenario, the clinker-to-cement ratio
28The EU 27 minus Romania and Bulgaria until 2007, plus Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland
after 2008. However, data for Cyprus and Bulgaria are not available until 2008, and UK data
are inaccurate for phase I because of the opt-out condition. The geographical perimeter
considered at the European level is guided by the available EUTL data coverage (so only a
part of UK production is considered in phase I). The production of clinker and cement as well
as net imports have been modified to take into account the changing geographical perimeter.
29Ideally we would have used the 2004 values if they had been available in the GNR database
as in this method technological abatement is necessarily zero in 2005. However some time was
probably needed for cement companies to adapt and take the EU ETS into account in their
operational decisions.
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will stay at 77% from 2005 to 2012. In the “Trend” scenario, the clinker-to-
cement ratio will start at 77% in 2005 and decrease by 0.8% per year, to finish
at 73.5 % in 2012. In this case, the estimated abatement will be higher in the
“Freeze” scenario, since the counterfactual scenario is more pessimistic (higher
emissions).
Estimating what would have happened in the absence of an event (here
the introduction of the EU ETS) is in itself very challenging. Suggesting that
parameter values would have ranged between the “Freeze” and “Trend” scenarios
is a rule of thumb that is admittedly simplistic, but has the virtue of avoiding
the setting of arbitrary values for the parameters. Table 3 displays results when
this method is applied for predicting 2005 values in the EU 28. Except for the
clinker-to-cement ratio and the carbon intensity of the fuel mix, slightly out of
the interval, the order of magnitudes are fairly correct30.
Table 3: Verification. Do the “Freeze” and “Trend” scenarios provide a good interval for
changes in variables over time? Application on year 2005 for the EU 28 using 1990 and 2000
values. In this case, 2005 “Freeze” values are equal to 2000 values, and the trend rate is the
one between 1990 and 2000.
2005 2005 2005
Variable Unit 1990 “Freeze” Real “Trend” Observation
Rt % 78.4% 77.5% 75.9% 77.1% overestimation
IEn,t GJ per ton of clinker 4,07 3,73 3,69 3,57 Interval OK
IEl,t kWh per ton of cement 114 110 109 108 Interval OK.
CEFF,t kgCO2/GJ 90.9 91.3 88.3 91.5 overestimation
CEFelec,t kgCO2/MWh 474 381 363 342 Interval OK
Figure 17 shows the results of the abatement estimates. Values shown cor-
respond to the average of the two scenarios, and with the original values of
scenarios as the error interval. We find that between 2005 and 2012, the Euro-
pean cement industry abated 26 Mtons (± 16 Mtons) of CO2 emissions, which
corresponds to a decrease of 2.2% (± 1.3%) in emissions. However, this abate-
ment could be due to an external cause - energy prices - rather than to the EU
ETS. Indeed the prices of steam coal and petcoke (the two main energy sources
used to produce clinker) roughly doubled from 2003-4 to 2010-11 as the graphs
on p.31 of Cembureau (2012) show31. Increasing “conventional energy” prices
reinforce the profitability of using substitutes rather than clinker, alternative
fuels, and increasing energy efficiency.
30Our counterfactual is likely to be more precise for two reasons. First, the trend is based
on a shorter term (5 years instead of 10). Second, 1990 was the first year for which data is
collected, which was done in 2005. Then the level of assurance of 1990 details is not to the
standard of later years.
31Steam coal and petcoke prices have fallen since 2011, due, among other reasons, to the
shale gas boom in the US. If the downward trend persists, a degradation of the cement
performance indicators would support this explanation.
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(a) Absolute abatement (left axis for the EU ETS perimeter, right axis for the others)
in millions of tons.
(b) Relative abatement as a percentage of total emissions
Figure 17: “Technological” abatement between 2005 and 2012. The bars correspond to the
“Freeze” scenario estimates (the top bar except for France) and the “Trend” scenario estimates
(the bottom bar except for France).
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Figure 18: Technological abatement in the EU ETS perimeter. The curves on the left side
show the abatement due to the different effects under the “Freeze” scenario (dotted line) and
the “Trend” scenario (dashed line). The histogram on the right gives the sum of abatements
over the years, in full color for the “Trend” scenario, and in full color plus faded color for the
“Freeze” scenario.
Germany is the European country that has abated the most in absolute
terms (9 Mtons ± 5 Mtons) and in percentage terms with the UK32 (-4.9% ±
2.7% and -4.3% ± 2.7%). The abatement in France is small but positive (-1.5%
± 0.5%) while the abatement in Italy is small but negative (+0.6% ± 0.4%).
The uncertainty in the evaluation of abatement in Spain and Poland is high
(but both average values are negative).
The results described above come from a simple difference between actual
and counterfactual emissions. An LMDI decomposition analysis allows us to
investigate what levers have been used to provide actual abatement. The results
are shown in Figure 18. Almost all of the technological abatement in the EU
ETS perimeter comes from clinker share reduction (between 16 and 32 Mtons
of CO2) followed by alternative fuels (between 2 and 12 Mtons of CO2), while
the decrease in energy efficiency led to negative abatement (between 4 and 7
Mtons of CO2).
The detailed results, country by country, are given in the Appendix and a
summary of the results is given in Table 4. Clinker reduction is the main lever
of technological abatement and led to actual abatement in Germany, France,
the UK, and Poland but negative abatement in Spain and Italy. In all countries
except France, abatement due to clinker substitution decreased (being nega-
tive in some countries) after the economic downturn. This could be explained
32For the UK at the national level, we use corrected GNR data for emissions for phase I as
in the previous section because of the inaccuracy of EUTL data.
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by overcapacity and excess clinker production. Alternative fuel led to positive
abatement in Spain, the UK and Poland and negative abatement in other coun-
tries (in France and Germany it could be because decarbonisation of the fuel mix
had already started before the beginning of the EU ETS, so the “Trend” scenario
gives lower emissions and actual abatement is harder to achieve). The thermal
energy efficiency effect brought positive abatement in Germany, was neutral in
the UK and brought negative abatement in France, Italy, and Poland. The elec-
tric energy efficiency effect brought positive abatement in the UK and Poland,
was neutral in France and brought negative abatement in Germany, Italy and
Spain. Electricity decarbonisation led to positive abatement in France, Spain,
the UK and Italy and was insignificant in Germany and Poland.
Table 4: Impact of different technological options on technological abatement
EU ETS Germany France Spain UK Italy Poland
Clinker reduction + + + − + − +
Alternative fuel + − − + + = +
Thermal Energy Efficiency − + − = = − −
Electric Energy Efficiency − − = − + − +
Elec Decarbonisation + = + + + + =
Note: a + in clinker reduction means that clinker reduction indeed provided
positive technological abatement. = stands for indeterminate (when the error
interval overlaps zero in the decomposition)
5.3. Overallocation profits
Numerous studies have demonstrated that electricity companies have reaped
windfall profits by passing through the allowance price to their consumers while
they had received the allowances for free (Sijm et al., 2006). Indeed, even allo-
cated free of charge, allowances can be sold and therefore have an opportunity
cost.
The ability to pass through the allowance price to consumers has not been
well-established for cement companies. Economic theory suggests that for lin-
ear demand curves, pass-through rates are higher in competitive markets than
in monopolies (because prices are more directly linked to marginal production
costs), and for markets with elastic supplies and inelastic demands (Sijm et al.,
2008; Wooders et al., 2009). The cement industry is an oligopoly with moder-
ately elastic supply and inelastic demand (Selim and Salem, 2010), which would
suggest moderately-high pass-through rates (75-80%) (Oxera Consulting, 2004).
To our knowledge, the only two empirical studies of pass-through rates in the
European cement sector are to our knowledge an old study from Walker (2006),
which unveils positive but moderate pass-through rates for 2005 (25-35%, de-
pending on the country), and Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) for the German cement,
lime and plaster sector finding a higher pass-through (73%).
In this article, we focus on another source of “windfall” profits obtained
from the EU ETS: overallocation profits. The principle of overallocation profits
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is straightforward. When the number of EUAs33, given free of charge to cement
companies, is higher than emissions necessary to manufacture the amount of
cement really produced; a surplus of EUAs is automatically generated. These
allowances can then be sold and will generate profits.
If we eliminate emissions due to electricity consumption from equation (7),
which are not accounted for by cement companies in the EU ETS, we have the
equation:
CEUTL,t = Qcement,t ×Rt ×Ht × (CEFpro + IEn,t × CEFF,t) (13)
where CEUTL,t are direct emissions, Qcement,t is cement production, Ht the
clinker home production ratio, CEFpro the process emissions, IEn,t the energy
intensity and CEFF,t the carbon intensity of the fuel mix.
With the given state of technology in the EU 28 in 2005, and no clinker
trade (H = 1), an allocation cap At allows the production of a certain quantity
of cement QAtcement without buying or selling allowances:
QAtcement =
At
REU282005(CEFpro + IEn,EU282005CEFF,EU282005)
= At
CeCIEU282005
(14)
with the cement carbon intensity of the EU 28 in 2005 (CeCIEU282005) being
656 kg of CO2 per ton of cement34. In the rest of the article we will call QAtcement
the “production equivalent associated with the cap At”.
We compute the difference between actual emissions Ct (associated with
values Qcement,t, Rt, Ht, IEn,t and CEFF,t) and the reference situation cor-
responding to the cap At (associated with values QAtcement, REU282005 , H = 1,
IEn,EU282005 and CEFF,EU282005); and decompose it35 using the same LMDI
decomposition method as in section 4. We then keep the activity effect, the
clinker trade effect, and group the other effects under the name “technology”
effect.
The technology effect gives the proportion of the EUAs surplus due to tech-
nological performance, while the activity and clinker trade effects give the pro-
portions of the EUAs surplus due to underactivity and clinker outsourcing.
Overallocation is then defined as the sum of the activity and clinker trade ef-
fects. The computed overallocation can be seen as the difference between actual
33for the European Union Allowance, the “standard” allowance. Allowances from offset
credits are CER (Certified Emission Reductions) for Clean Development Mechanisms and
ERU (Emissions Reduction Units) from Joint Implementation.
34Calculated with the EU 28 values in 2005 of R, CEFpro, IEn and CEFF which are
respectively 75.9%, 0.538 tCO2/ton of clinker, 3.69 GJ/ton of clinker and 0.0883tCO2/MJ.
35We use the EU ETS value of CEFPRO in this section, as the heart of the question is the
EUAs surplus and not “real” emissions.
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allocation and output-based allocation, based on current clinker production with
a certain level of technology (European average in 2005).
We choose to base the reference situation for technological performance on
the 2005 European average values so that the reference situation brings zero
extra costs on average at the European level. The estimation of overallocation
is then rather conservative, another option could have been to take the tech-
nological performance of the best-performing installations, as in the phase III
benchmarking (Ecofys et al., 2009).
Figure 19 shows the decomposition of the EU ETS allowances surplus over
time. The EUAs surplus is the sum of the activity effect, the trade effect and
the technology effect; which are positive respectively when production is lower
than the production equivalent associated with the cap (QAtcement), when net
imports are positive, and when cement carbon intensity is lower than the 2005
EU 28 level. Overallocation, the sum of the activity and trade effects, can be
negative (in this case there is underallocation) when cement production is high
and/or the region is exporting clinker. It can also be higher than the EUAs
surplus if the technology effect is negative (high cement carbon intensity). The
activity and trade effect can cancel each other out, leading to no overallocation,
for example when a region is producing a high quantity of cement but importing
clinker.
We also add to the EUAs surplus the offset credits used by the cement
industry to show the “real” allowances surplus. Indeed, European authorities
allowed companies to use offset credits (CERs or ERUs) to meet emissions caps
during phase II. The offset limit as a share of allocations was not harmonized
at the European level but differed among member states: 22% for Germany for
example but only 8% in the UK (Vasa, 2012). Companies could directly finance
projects and receive offset credits or purchase offset credits in the secondary
market (including pure swapping of EUAs to exploit the spread and maximize
trading profits).
The first year that the EU ETS came into force, the overall cap was slightly
too generous with an overallocation of 12 million EUAs (roughly 8% of the
cap). The increase in production in the following two years because of economic
growth, and a housing bubble in certain countries, while the cap was unchanged,
led to a reduction in the overallocation. Given European production levels at
that time, there would have been underallocation had net imports not been so
massive. In 2005, 2006 and 2007, roughly 30 million EUAs were saved thanks
to the outsourcing of 9, 11 and 14 Mt of clinker respectively.
The economic downturn after 2008 led to a sharp decrease in production
and therefore a massive surplus of EUAs. We estimate that the low level of
activity brought 47, 52, 50 and 56 million of overallocated EUAs in 2009 to
2012 respectively (between 25% and 32% of the annual cap). After 2009, Europe
became a net exporter of clinker (up to 6 Mt of clinker in 2012), so the clinker
trade effect brought negative overallocation (e.g. underallocation) of 10 million
EUAs (1.5% of the cap). Of the EUAs surplus for phases I and II, 45 million
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Figure 19: Overallocation over time in the EU ETS perimeter.
EUAs (3% of the cap) can be attributed to the technology effect36. For phase
II, 84% of the surplus of 248 million EUAs was due to overallocation.
While having an excess of allowances, companies made intensive use of
project-based credits. Sandbag data at the installation level reveals that vir-
tually all cement installations used offset credits, and that the overwhelming
majority of them surrendered credits up to a fixed share of allocation, which
can be inferred at the maximum amount authorized for cement installations in
each country37: 22% in Germany, 13.5% in France, 7.9% in Spain, 8.0% in the
UK, 7.5% in Italy and 10% in Poland. In total, 89 million offset credits were
used, representing 10% of the cap. The total surplus for phase II was then 337
million allowances, representing almost the equivalent of two years of allocation.
Figure 20 displays the decomposition38 of the phase I and II allowances
36This corresponds to a “Freeze” scenario for which cement production would have been
equal to the production equivalent associated with the cap, which was higher than actual
production, which is why this figure is higher than the “Freeze” scenario of the previous
section (42 million).
37For Spain (20.6%) and Italy (15%), there is a discrepancy between the share of allocation
authorized at the national level in Vasa (2012) and the one we found at the cement installation
level. An explanation could be that in these two countries the proportion of offset was probably
differentiated among sectors at the installation level.
38For computing overallocation per country we chose to consider a European average bench-
mark rather than a national benchmark to put each country on an equal footing. However as
the guiding principle of allocations in phase I and II was grandfathering, we also performed
computations with national carbon intensities of cement (respectively 618, 637, 672, 710, 644
and 660 kgCO2 per ton of cement in Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland). For
a given cap, a lower carbon intensity of cement will correspond to a higher equivalent quantity
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(a) Decomposition of the allowances surplus (left axis for the EU ETS perimeter,
right axis for main European countries)
(b) Decomposition of the allowances surplus, in years worth of allocations or
relative to average annual cap
Figure 20: Decomposition of the allowances surplus
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surplus at the EU ETS level and for the main European producers39. A complete
year by year decomposition (as in Figure 19) is available in the Appendix for
each country.
The cumulated overallocation at the EU ETS level for phases I and II is
estimated at 224 million EUAs (89% due to the activity effect and 11% due to
the trade effect). The country with by far the highest overallocation is Spain (65
million EUAs) followed by Italy (27 million EUAs), because of massive clinker
imports in phase I and large falls in production in phase II.
In these two countries, while the overallocation in phase II is overwhelmingly
dominated by the activity effect, the impact of the trade effect on cumulated
overallocation for phases I and II is significant (33% for Spain and 42% for
Italy). Indeed there was a negative activity effect in phase I (higher production
than the production equivalent associated with the cap) which cancels out some
of the positive activity effect (underproduction) in phase II. Conversely, there
was no significant negative trade effect in phase II to cancel out the positive
trade effect in phase I. Italy continued to be a clinker importer in phase II while
Spain’s net exports after 2009 were much smaller in magnitude than its net
imports before the crisis.
Overallocation was also positive in France (9 million EUAs, more than half of
it due to trade) and Poland (6 million EUAs, with a negative trade effect), while
there was actually underallocation in Germany (minus 9 million EUAs, due to
high production after 2008 and clinker exports). In relative terms, overallocation
was also the highest in Spain and the UK (2.2 years worth of allocations) followed
by Italy (0.9).
The technological performance varies significantly across countries and so
does the share of the technology effect in the EUAs surplus (which is 45 million
EUAs at the EU ETS level). Germany ranks first with 25 million EUAs earned
thanks to low cement carbon intensity, followed by France (5 million EUAs).
The technology effect is very small in the UK, Italy and Poland (0, 2, and 2
million EUAs respectively) and even negative in Spain (minus 4 million EUAs).
In relative terms, Germany is also first (1.2 years worth of allocations) followed
by France (0.3).
As mentioned above, because the thresholds vary from country to coun-
try, the number of surrendered offset credits varied significantly among member
states. During phase II, they represented 21.1%, 13.3%, 7.4%, 6.7%, 7.2% and
8.4% of annual EUAs cap in Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland
respectively. These differences raise concerns about equity between member
states, that add to concerns about the equity of national allocation plans. For-
of cement, and thus to a higher surplus and higher overallocation profits due to activity. The
only noticeable difference is for Germany: because of its high technological performance, the
alternative computation led to a smaller technology effect and a greater (and positive) activity
effect, and thus no underallocation. For the other countries the differences are not significant.
39In this section, for UK at the national level we use EU ETS data rather than GNR
corrected data though the coverage is incomplete, because the key question is the EUAs
surplus.
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tunately, member states with the most stringent allocation plans were generally
the most generous regarding the use of offset credits (see Table 5). The use
of offset credits has made Germany’s allowances surplus more than double the
EUAs surplus (38 million allowances compared to 16 million EUAs, represent-
ing an increase of 140%). The impact of offset credits on the surplus was also
relatively significant in France (+72%) and Poland (+55%) but less so in Italy
(+34%), Spain (+18%), and the UK (+17%).
Table 5: Decomposition of phase II allowances surplus
EU ETS Germany France Spain UK Italy Poland
EUAs Surplus (millions) 248 7 14 58 19 34 5
EUAs Surplus (% cap) 28% 7% 18% 39% 39% 25% 9%
Technology Effect (MEUAs) 38 17 3 -3 1 1 2
Activity Effect (MEUAs) 215 -7 8 62 17 28 3
Trade Effect (MEUAs) -5 -3 3 -1 1 6 0
Overallocation (% Surplus) 84% -138% 77% 105% 93% 97% 54%
Offsets (millions) 89 22 10 11 3 10 5
Offsets (% cap) 10.4% 21.1% 13.7% 7.4% 8.0% 7.3% 8.5%
After having decomposed the allowances surplus and computed overallo-
cation, let us turn to overallocation profits and offset savings. To estimate
overallocation profits, we multiply yearly overallocation by the yearly average
allowance spot price40. If negative, overallocation profits correspond to under-
allocation profit losses. If overallocation can be estimated with a high degree
of accuracy, overallocation profits are more difficult to estimate because car-
bon prices vary within a year and, more importantly, allowances can be banked
except from phase I to phase II. It is well-known that companies have kept a
significant share of allowances as a hedge against a future scarcity).
To estimate a lower limit of savings brought by offset credits, we multiply
yearly surrendered offset credits by yearly EUA-CER spread values given by
Stephan et al. (2014) (4.05e, 1.54e, 2.06e, 3.34e and 4.87e from 2008 to 2012
respectively). Actual savings are higher for two reasons. First, if companies
originate the projects, actual costs of project-based credits are much lower and
savings are thus higher (for example a HFC gas project can bring offset credits
less than a few Euros per ton of CO2, bringing more than ten Euros of savings
per allowance before 2012). Second, the use of offset credits increased the global
cap and therefore decreased the EUA price (Stephan et al., 2014).
Results are shown in Figure 21. We estimate overallocation profits at the EU
ETS level at 3.5 billion Euros. Overallocation profits would have been higher
with higher EUA prices, but the latter dropped precisely because of a surplus of
40Obtained by Tendances Carbone of CDC Climat (http://www.cdcclimat.com/-
publications-.html), from 2005 to 2012 respectively: 18.04e, 17.3e, 0.7e, 22.2e, 13.1e, 14.3e,
13.0e and 7.4e).
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Figure 21: Overallocation profits and offset savings in the EU ETS perimeter (left axis) and
main European countries (right axis)
allowances, which was the main cause of the overallocation profits. However the
EUA price would have been higher had the offset credits not been authorized.
The country with by far the highest overallocation profits is Spain (824 Me)
followed by Italy (324 Me) and the UK (275 Me). Then come France (120 Me)
and Poland (103 Me). Germany has 100 Me of underallocation profit losses.
A low bound of offset savings is assessed at 342 Me at the EU ETS level, and
Germany is the country that benefits the most with 83 Me.
Cumulated overallocation profits for the six countries reported is around
1.5 billion Euros, i.e. slightly less than half of overallocation profits at the
EU ETS level, whereas they account for two thirds of allocations. We can
surmise (based on EUTL data of EUAs surplus) that overallocation profits were
particularly high because of the activity effect in Romania, Bulgaria, Greece,
Cyprus, Hungary and Ireland where the accumulated EUAs surplus in phase II
roughly corresponded to two years of allocations.
Discussing overallocation profits by company and not by country is also
relevant as the European cement market is dominated by a few multinational
companies (see Table 6). In the case of the EU ETS, we find that the five and fif-
teen biggest firms account for 56% and 86% of emissions in phase II respectively.
Unfortunately, the GNR database only distinguishes countries and not compa-
nies, so the only information we can obtain is the EUAs surplus through the
EUTL database and the offset credits used through the Sandbag database. A
rough estimate (considering that among the total 3.5 Ge of overallocation prof-
its, companies’ overallocation profits are proportional to their EUAs surplus)
leads to overallocation profits of 679Me, 436Me, 370Me, 364Me and 328Me
for Lafarge, HeidelbergCement, Holcim, Cemex and Italcementi respectively.
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Table 6: The major European cement producers were present in many different countries in
2012
% Emissions Countries
Phase II EU ETS Germany France Spain UK Italy Poland
Lafarge 15% 11 X X X X X
Heidelberg 14% 11 X X X
Holcim 10% 10 X X X X
Italcementi 11% 6 X X X
Cemex 7% 5 X X X X
Buzzi 7% 5 X X X
Lafarge declared in its annual reports41, from 2008 to 2012, 605 Me of gains
due to excess rights over actual emissions. This figure is not directly comparable
to our estimation of overallocation profits, because an unknown (but small)
fraction is due to technological performance (not considered as overallocation
profits in our estimation), and more importantly because allowances can be
banked.
Furthermore, our definition of overallocation profits leaves out offset credits.
However, surrendering offset credits allows more EUAs to be banked (almost
40% more at the European level for phase II), and therefore increases gains due
to excess rights over actual emissions which are reported by companies.
Based on all these points, we can estimate than the biggest European pro-
ducer has sold at least half of the EUAs surplus, and we can infer a similar
situation for the whole cement industry. Indeed, companies faced cash con-
straints because of the economic recession and selling EUAs provided an easy
access to liquidity. These EUAs transfers have added to the downward trend
of the carbon price (IETA, 2012), in turn decreasing the value of overallocation
profits.
6. Conclusion
We have analysed and quantified the key drivers of carbon emissions from
1990 to 2012 in the European cement industry using an LMDI decomposition
analysis. Most of the emissions changes in the EU 27 can be attributed to the
activity effect. The clinker trade effect has counterbalanced approximately one
third of the high activity effect in 2005-2008, because of high clinker imports at
41Lafarge annual reports for the years year 2008 to 2012 (Lafarge, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) in
pages F29 for 2009 to 2011 and F31 for 2012. The gains are 85 Me, 142Me, 158Me, 136Me
and 84 Me from 2008 to 2012 respectively. The same sentence is also copied and pasted
into each annual report in year X: “For year X+1, based on our estimate of allowances to be
received and based on our current production forecasts, which may evolve in case of market
trends different that from those expected of today, the allowances granted should exceed our
needs on a consolidated basis.”
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that period when production capacities were fully employed. In addition, since
the 1990s there has been a slow trend of emissions reductions mostly due to the
clinker share effect, but also to the fuel mix effect and the electricity emissions
factor effect. Next, we have estimated technological abatement induced by the
EU ETS. Because of a small acceleration in clinker reduction and alternative
fuel use after 2005, 26 Mtons of CO2 (±16 Mtons) of emissions have been abated
from 2005 to 2012, corresponding to a 2.2% (± 1.3%) decrease. However these
effects could have been due to the rise of energy prices rather than the EU
ETS. Finally, decomposing the allowance surplus allowed overallocation and
thus overallocation profits to be assessed. The cement industry reaped 3.5
billion Euros of overallocation profits during phases I and II, mainly because of
the slowdown in production, while allowance caps were unchanged.
European cement companies have been suffering from the economic down-
turn through reduced sales, low return on investment (BCG, 2013) and a decline
in profits (Bolscher et al., 2013). However, their financial situation would have
been far worse had the EU ETS not been implemented. During phase II, the
scheme was tantamount to a subsidy of 3.5 Euros per tonne of cement produced
in Europe42, which significantly increased the profitability of the sector43. Pre-
sented as a threat to competitiveness, the EU ETS has paradoxically boosted
European cement industry competitiveness, when defined as a company’s ability
to earn (Quirion, 2010).
Since 2013 and the beginning of phase III, the EU ETS conditions have
been less favorable for the cement industry, because of an increased stringency
of the allocation methodology. The allocation is now based on the average
of the 10% best-performing installations, corresponding to 766 kgCO2 per ton
of clinker (European Commission, 2011), and declines at a rate of 1.74% per
year. However, this benchmark is then multiplied for each installation by the
historical activity level (HAL), which is generally based on pre-crisis levels44.
Overallocation occurred in 2013 (emissions were 20% lower than the cap) and
will go on for the years to come unless production significantly increases.
Because of high levels of uncertainty concerning future production levels,
the difference between HAL and actual production can be very large. The
choice of HAL thus has deep financial repercussions on companies: too high
a HAL automatically brings overallocation profits while one that is too low
induces losses of profit. Output-based allocations, which consists in linking
directly allocations to production, have the desirable benefit of by-passing the
423.5 billion Euros of overallocation profits divided by 1 billion tonnes of cement produced.
43Based on financial data (including reported sales of allowances), Boyer and Ponssard
(2013) find that the EBIDTA/sales ratio (Earnings Before Investment, Depreciation, Taxes
and Amortization) of the Western European cement industry for phase II would have been
26.3% without sales of allowances, instead of 32.9%. Furthermore, the impact would have
been more significant had cement companies sold all these financial assets instead of banking
a significant share.
44The HAL is, except for changes in capacity, the median value of the annual activity during
the period 2005-2008 or 2009-2010 (whichever is the highest) (European Commission, 2011).
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determination of HAL and the potential overallocation profits or underallocation
profit losses that accompany it. Given the order of magnitude of financial values
at stake that have been reported in this analysis, this advantage outweighs by
far potential drawbacks45. Such a dynamic allocation (Borkent et al., 2014)
would lead to fewer economic distortions and more incentives to reduce carbon
emissions than the current allocation methodology. An alternative option would
be full auctioning with the inclusion of importers (Neuhoff et al., 2014).
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on work carried out in the CECILIA2050 research
project, funded by the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme
for Research (grant agreement number 308680, www.cecilia2050.eu). The au-
thors wish to acknowledge Bruno Vanderborght, Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Mis-
ato Sato for their helpful comments and suggestions. They are also grateful to
DG Clima for maintaining the EUTL public registry, and to the WBCSD and
all the people who contribute to the Getting the numbers right (GNR) database.
References
Alexeeva-Talebi, V. (2010). Cost pass-through in strategic oligopoly: Sectoral
evidence for the EU ETS. ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research
Discussion Paper, (10-056).
Ang, B. (2005). The LMDI approach to decomposition analysis: a practical
guide. Energy Policy, 33(7):867–871.
Ang, B. W. (2004). Decomposition analysis for policymaking in energy: which
is the preferred method? Energy Policy, 32(9):1131–1139.
Barker, D. J., Turner, S. A., Napier-Moore, P. A., Clark, M., and Davison, J. E.
(2009). CO2 capture in the cement industry. Energy Procedia, 1(1):87–94.
BCG (2013). The cement sector: a strategic contributor to europe’s future.
Technical report, Boston Consulting Group.
Bhattacharyya, S. C. and Ussanarassamee, A. (2004). Decomposition of en-
ergy and CO2 intensities of thai industry between 1981 and 2000. Energy
Economics, 26(5):765–781.
45These drawbacks include fluctuating cap, administrative complexity, or providing little
incentive to reduce the consumption of polluting goods (Quirion, 2009). However, these
defaults can be mitigated with an appropriate design and additional policies. An extended
discussion of optimal design for output-based allocations and complementary policies, as well
as the comparison between other anti-leakage policies is beyond the scope of this paper. For
more information we recommend Dröge (2009), Branger and Quirion (2014), ? and Neuhoff
et al. (2014).
44
Boemare, C. and Quirion, P. (2002). Implementing greenhouse gas trading
in europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences.
Ecological Economics, 43(2–3):213–230.
Bolscher, H., Graichen, V., Hay, G., Healy, S., Lenstra, J., Meindert, L.,
Regeczi, D., von Schickfus, M.-T., Schumacher, K., and Timmons-Smakman,
F. (2013). Carbon leakage evidence project. Technical report, Ecorys - Oko
Instititu - Cambridge Econometrics - TNO.
Borkent, B., Gilbert, A., Klaassen, E., Neelis, M., and Blok, K. (2014). Dynamic
allocation for the EU emissions trading system. enabling sustainable growth.
Technical report, Ecofys.
Boyer, M. and Ponssard, J.-P. (2013). Economic analysis of the european cement
industry. Technical report, Ecole Polytechnique - CIRANO.
Branger, F., Lecuyer, O., and Quirion, P. (2013a). The european union emissions
trading system : should we throw the flagship out with the bathwater ?
Technical Report DT/WP 2013-48.
Branger, F., Ponssard, J. P., Sartor, O., and Sato, M. (2014). Distortions from
activity level thresholds in the EU-ETS. evidence from the cement sector.
Grantham working paper 169.
Branger, F. and Quirion, P. (2014). Climate policy and the ‘carbon haven’
effect. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(1):53–71.
Branger, F., Quirion, P., and Chevallier, J. (2013b). Carbon leakage and com-
petitiveness of cement and steel industries under the EU ETS: much ado
about nothing. Working Paper CIRED DT/WP No 2013-53.
Cembureau (2012). Activity report 2011. Technical report, Cembureau.
Chen, S. (2011). The abatement of carbon dioxide intensity in china: Factors
decomposition and policy implications. The World Economy, 34(7):1148–
1167.
Cook, G. (2011). Investment, carbon pricing and leakage - a cement sector
perspective. Technical report, Climate Strategies.
deCanio, S. (1998). The efficiency paradox: bureaucratic and organizational
barriers to profitable energy-saving investments - firms, markets, relational
contracting. Energy Policy, 26(5):441–454.
Dröge, S. (2009). Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices. Technical
report, Climate Strategies, Cambridge, UK.
Ecofys, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, and Oko
Institut (2009). Methodology for the free allocation of emission allowances
in the EU ETS post 2012. sector report for the cement industry. Technical
report, By order of the European Commission.
45
Egenhofer, C., Alessi, M., Georgiev, A., and Fujiwara, N. (2011). The EU
emissions trading system and climate policy towards 2050: Real incentives to
reduce emissions and drive innovation? SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1756736,
Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY.
Ellerman, A. D. and Buchner, B. K. (2007). The european union emissions trad-
ing scheme: Origins, allocation, and early results. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy, 1(1):66–87.
Ellerman, A. D. and Buchner, B. K. (2008). Over-allocation or abatement? a
preliminary analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2005–06 emissions data.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 41(2):267–287.
European Commission (2009). Directive 2009/29/EC of the european parlia-
ment and of the council of 23 april 2009 amending directive 2003/87/EC so as
to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme
of the community.
European Commission (2010). Draft reference document on best available tech-
niques in the cement, lime and magnesium oxyd manufacturing industries.
Technical report, Joint Research Center.
European Commission (2011). Commission decision of 27 april 2011 determin-
ing transitional union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission
allowances pursuant to article 10a of directive 2003/87/EC of the european
parliament and of the council. Technical Report (2011/278/EU).
Hammond, G. and Norman, J. (2012). Decomposition analysis of energy-related
carbon emissions from UK manufacturing. Energy, 41(1):220–227.
Hoenig, V. and Twigg, C. (2009). Development of state-of-the-art techniques
in cement manufacturing - trying to look ahead. Technical report, Cement
Sustainability Initiative - European Cement Research Academy.
IEA (2009). Cement technology roadmap 2009. carbon emission reductions up to
2050. Technical report, World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD).
IETA (2012). IETA urges european commission to consider broader ETS reform
options. Technical report, International Emissions Trading Association.
Jaffe, A. B. and Stavins, R. N. (1994). The energy-efficiency gap what does it
mean? Energy Policy, 22(10):804–810.
Kettner, C., Kletzan-Slamanig, D., and Köppl, A. (2014). The EU emission
trading scheme: sectoral allocation and factors determining emission changes.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, pages 1–14.
Kim, Y. and Worrell, E. (2002a). CO2 emission trends in the cement industry:
An international comparison. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global
Change, 7(2):115–133.
46
Kim, Y. and Worrell, E. (2002b). International comparison of CO2 emission
trends in the iron and steel industry. Energy Policy, 30(10):827–838.
Lafarge (2009). Annual report 2009. Technical report.
Lafarge (2010). Annual report registration document 2010. Technical report.
Lafarge (2011). Registration document annual report 2011. Technical report.
Lafarge (2012). Annual report registration document 2012. Technical report.
Li, J., Tharakan, P., Macdonald, D., and Liang, X. (2013). Technological,
economic and financial prospects of carbon dioxide capture in the cement
industry. Energy Policy, 61:1377–1387.
Liu, N. and Ang, B. (2007). Factors shaping aggregate energy intensity trend for
industry: Energy intensity versus product mix. Energy Economics, 29(4):609–
635.
Matthes, F., Repenning, J., Worrell, E., Phylipsen, D., and Müller, N. (2008).
Pilot on benchmarking in the EU ETS - report prepared for the german
federal ministry for the environment, nature conservation and nuclear safety
and the dutch ministry of economic affairs. Technical report, Oko Institut -
Ecofys.
Mikulčić, H., Vujanović, M., and Duić, N. (2013). Reducing the CO2 emissions
in croatian cement industry. Applied Energy, 101:41–48.
Moya, J., Pardo, N., and Mercier, A. (2010). Energy efficiency and CO2 emis-
sions : Prospective scenarios for the cement industry. JRC scientific and
technical reports, JRC European Commission.
Moya, J. A., Pardo, N., and Mercier, A. (2011). The potential for improvements
in energy efficiency and CO2 emissions in the EU27 cement industry and the
relationship with the capital budgeting decision criteria. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 19(11):1207–1215.
Neuhoff, K., Vanderborght, B., Ancygier, A., Atasoy, A. T., Haussner, M.,
Ismer, R., Mack, B., Martin, R., Ponssard, J.-P., Quirion, P., van Rooij, A.,
Sabio, N., Sartor, O., Sato, M., and Schopp, A. (2014). Carbon control and
competitiveness post 2020: The cement report. Technical report, Climate
Strategies.
Oficemen (2013). Anuario 2012. Technical report.
Oxera Consulting (2004). CO2 emissions trading: How will it affect UK indus-
try? report prepared for the UK carbon trust. Technical report.
Ozawa, L. (2002). Energy use and CO2 emissions in mexico’s iron and steel
industry. Energy, 27(3):225–239.
47
Pardo, N., Moya, J. A., and Mercier, A. (2011). Prospective on the energy
efficiency and CO2 emissions in the EU cement industry. Energy, 36(5):3244–
3254.
Pearson, A. (2010). The carbon rich list : The companies profiting from the
european union emissions trading scheme. Technical report, Sandbag.
Ponssard, J.-P. and Walker, N. (2008). EU emissions trading and the cement
sector: a spatial competition analysis. Climate Policy, 8(5):467–493.
Quirion, P. (2009). Historic versus output-based allocation of GHG tradable
allowances: a comparison. Climate Policy, 9(6):575–592.
Quirion, P. (2010). Competitiveness and leakage. In Climate Change Policies -
Global Challenges and Future Prospects, pages 77–94. Emilio Cerdá, Univer-
sity of Vigo, Spain.
Reinaud, J. (2008). Issues behind competitiveness and carbon leakage. focus
on heavy industry. IEA information paper, International Energy Agency,
OECD/IEA Paris.
Schneider, M., Romer, M., Tschudin, M., and Bolio, H. (2011). Sustainable
cement production—present and future. Cement and Concrete Research,
41(7):642–650.
Selim, T. and Salem, A. (2010). Global cement industry: Competitive and
institutional dimensions. Technical Report 24464.
Sheinbaum, C., Ozawa, L., and Castillo, D. (2010). Using logarithmic mean
divisia index to analyze changes in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions
in mexico’s iron and steel industry. Energy Economics, 32(6):1337–1344.
Sijm, J., Hers, S., Lise, W., and Wetzelaer, B. (2008). The impact of the EU
ETS on electricity prices - final report to DG environment of the european
commission. Technical Report ECN-E–08-007.
Sijm, J., Neuhoff, K., and Chen, Y. (2006). CO2 cost pass-through and windfall
profits in the power sector. Climate Policy, 6(1):49–72.
Stephan, N., Bellassen, V., and Alberola, E. (2014). Utilisation des crédits kyoto
par les industriels européens: d’un marché efficace à l’éclatement d’une bulle
(in french). Etude Climat numéro 43, CDC Climat Recherche.
U.S. Geological Survey (2013). Mineral commodities summaries 2013. Technical
report, US Department of the Interior - US Geological Survey.
Vasa, A. (2012). Certified emissions reductions and CDM limits: revenue and
distributional aspects. Climate Policy, 12(6):645–666.
VDZ (German Cement Association) (2013). VDZ - activity report 2009-2012.
Technical report.
48
Walker, N. (2006). Concrete evidence? an empirical approach to quantify the
impact of EU emissions trading on cement industry competitiveness. Planning
and Environmental Policies Research Series PEP 06/10.
WBCSD (2009). The cement sustainability initiative - getting the numbers right
- report explaining the purpose and function of the GNR database. Technical
report, World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
Weigt, H., Ellerman, D., and Delarue, E. (2013). CO2 abatement from re-
newables in the german electricity sector: Does a CO2 price help? Energy
Economics, 40, Supplement 1:S149–S158.
Wooders, P., Cosbey, A., and Stephenson, J. (2009). Border carbon adjustments
and free allowances : Responding to competitiveness and leakage concerns.
Technical report, OECD.
Xu, J.-H., Fleiter, T., Eichhammer, W., and Fan, Y. (2012). Energy consump-
tion and CO2 emissions in china’s cement industry: A perspective from LMDI
decomposition analysis. Energy Policy, 50:821–832.
Xu, X. and Ang, B. (2013). Index decomposition analysis applied to CO2
emission studies. Ecological Economics, 93:313–329.
Yang, J. and Chen, B. (2010). Using LMDI method to analyze the change of
industrial CO2 emission from energy use in chongqing. Frontiers of Earth
Science, 5(1):103–109.
Zachman, G., Abrell, J., and Ndoye Faye, A. (2011). Assessing the impact of
the EU ETS using firm level data. Technical Report 2011/08.
Zhao, M., Tan, L., Zhang, W., Ji, M., Liu, Y., and Yu, L. (2010). Decomposing
the influencing factors of industrial carbon emissions in shanghai using the
LMDI method. Energy, 35(6):2505–2510.
7. Appendix
7.1. Formulas
4act−F = CF,T − CF,0ln(CF,T )− ln(CF,0) ln(
Qcement,T
Qcement,0
) (15)
4sha−F = CF,T − CF,0ln(CF,T )− ln(CF,0) ln(
RT
R0
) (16)
4tra−F = CF,T − CF,0ln(CF,T )− ln(CF,0) ln(
HT
H0
) (17)
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4fmix = CF,T − CF,0ln(CF,T )− ln(CF,0) ln(
CEFF,T
CEFF,0
) (18)
4eff−F = CF,T − CF,0ln(CF,T )− ln(CF,0) ln(
IT,T
IT,0
) (19)
4act−P = CP,T − CP,0ln(CP,T )− ln(CP,0) ln(
Qcement,T
Qcement,0
) (20)
4sha−P = CP,T − CP,0ln(CP,T )− ln(CP,0) ln(
RT
R0
) (21)
4tra−P = CP,T − CP,0ln(CP,T )− ln(CP,0) ln(
HT
H0
) (22)
4act−E = CE,T − CE,0ln(CE,T )− ln(CE,0) ln(
Qcement,T
Qcement,0
) (23)
4eff−E = CE,T − CE,0ln(CE,T )− ln(CE,0) ln(
IEl,T
IEl,0
) (24)
4Celec = CE,T − CE,0ln(CE,T )− ln(CE,0) ln(
CEFelec,T
CEFelec,0
) (25)
7.2. Technological abatement country by country
7.3. Overallocation country by country
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Figure 22: Technological abatement in Germany. The curves on the left side show the abate-
ment due to the different effects under the “Freeze” scenario (dotted line) and the “Trend”
scenario (dashed line). The histogram on the right gives the sum of abatements over the
years, in full color for the “Trend” scenario, and in full color plus faded color for the “Freeze”
scenario.
Figure 23: Technological abatement in France.
Figure 24: Technological abatement in Spain.
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Figure 25: Technological abatement in the UK.
Figure 26: Technological abatement in Italy.
Figure 27: Technological abatement in Poland.
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Figure 28: Overallocation in Germany.
Figure 29: Overallocation in France
Figure 30: Overallocation in Spain
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Figure 31: Overallocation in the UK
Figure 32: Overallocation in Italy
Figure 33: Overallocation in Poland
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